We extend Rochford's (1983) notion of symmetrically pairwise-bargained equilibrium to assignment games with more than two sides. A symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocation is a core allocation such that any agent is in equilibrium with respect to a negotiation process among all agents based on what every agent could receive -and use as a threat-in her preferred alternative matching to the optimal matching that is formed. We prove that, for balanced multi-sided assignment games, the set of SMB is always nonempty and that, unlike the two-sided case, it does not coincide in general with the kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965) . We also give an answer to an open question formulated by Rochford (1983) by introducing a kernel-based set that, together with the core, characterizes the set of SMB.
between competitive prices and core allocations. Therefore, the core represents the very first main approximation to resolve the problem of predicting which prices will emerge in a multisided assignment market. Nevertheless, Shapley and Shubik (1972) already noticed that one of the main drawbacks of the core as a prediction of the outcome of a cooperative game, in particular of a multi-sided assignment game, is that it is based only on what agents can do, not on what they can prevent other agents to do.
In this paper we show that, if agents do not base their behavioral strategy only on what they can do but also on what they can prevent others to do, the core of a balanced multi-sided assignment game can be non-trivially refined. This is made introducing a set of multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocations, that generalizes the set of pairwise-bargained (SPB) allocations introduced by Rochford (1983) . In particular, for two-sided assignment games this refinement coincides with the intersection between the kernel and the core, as The core of a game is the set of imputations that cannot be improved upon by any coalition on its own. Quint (1991) shows that, given a square multi-sided assignment game, its core, C(ω A ), is the set of nonnegative vectors x satisfying On the other hand, for any imputation 4 x of (N, ω A ) and any coalition S ⊆ N , the excess of coalition S with respect to x is defined by e(S, x) = ω A (S) − x(S), where x(S) = i∈S x i .
Given (N, ω A ) an arbitrary m-SAG, we introduce the following set, that is defined for any pair of agents j-i and any k-l,
Them, for any x ∈ I(ω A ), the surplus of agent
The above expression can be interpreted as the maximum that agent j-i can expect to obtain (if negative, the least she can expect to lose) if she departs from x without agent k-l's collaboration and assuming that other agents are happy with what they recieve in x. Notice that s j-i,k-l (x) is a bilateral concept, in the sense that only two agents, j-i and k-l, are involved in the definition. Then, an idea of bilateral equilibrium is formulated in the following property:
Observe that (P) implies that each pair of agents are in equilibrium through the bargaining 4 Given a cooperative game (N, v), the set of imputations is defined by
process defined in (3) . The kernel of (N, ω A ) is the set 5 K(ω A ) = {x ∈ I(ω A ) : x satisfies (P)} .
Main definitions
Let (N, ω A ) be a balanced m-SAG and let (µ, x) be the 'current' stable outcome. That is, agents are matched under an optimal matching µ and are paid the payoff x ∈ C(ω A ). Then suppose that some agent wonders about what would happen if she broke the essential coalition she belongs to in µ, formed a new essential coalition, payed to her hypothetical new partners the worth they are receiving in the current payoff x, whereas she would appropriate the rest of the worth of the new formed coalition. Since x is a core allocation, such worth will never
be larger than what she is currently receiving in x. In fact, the more such worth is below than what she is receiving in x, the less credible a threaten she might pose on other agents not to deviate from (µ, x) is. This is true in the sense that any change in the outcome would drive her lose part of her current payoff, whereas other agents would benefit. As any agent in the market can think in the same way, one would expect that, given a proposed allocation x, after a negotiation process among all agents, they should be paid exactly what they can threaten. However, such payoffs might not be efficient, in the sense that the market is always able to provide at least the whole resources to pay all agents their threats, but many times can pay more. In such case, the most straightforward idea to share the remaining benefits is to distribute them symmetrically.
To formalize all the above ideas we introduce the following set, that is defined for any 5 The kernel is introduced by Davis and Maschler (1965) . However, to be accurate, the definition provided in our paper is that of the pre-kernel Shapley, 1972, 1979) . Nevertheless, Maschler and Peleg (1967) prove that for zero-normalized and monotonic games the kernel coincides with the pre-kernel, which is always nonempty. A game (N, v) is zero-normalized if v({i}) = 0 for all i ∈ N and is monotonic if
Finally, it is straightforward to check that multi-sided assignment games are zero-normalized and monotonic.
7 agent j-i and any essential coalition E,
The concept of threat, that generalizes Rochford's (1983) definition to m-SAGs with more than two sides, is introduced in the following definition.
Definition 1 Given a balanced m-SAG
.., N m ) and x ∈ C(ω A ), the vector of threats t(x) ∈ R nm is defined by
for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where j-i ∈ E and E ∈ µ.
Some remarks must be made on the above definition. First observe that x ji − t ji (x) is the minimum loss that agent j-i would incur if, for some reason, the essential coalition she belongs to in some stable outcome broke. On the other hand, since x ∈ C(ω A ) and we have assumed that for any type there is at least one dummy agent 6 , we have that 0
Lastly, and most important, it can be checked that the vector of threats does not depend on the optimal matching µ chosen 7 .
The idea of a symmetrically sharing of the remainders of a negotiation process based on the above threats is formally introduced in the following definition and generalizes that from Rochford (1983) to m-SAGs with more than two sides.
Definition 2 Given a balanced m-SAG
I.e. there really are n + 1 agents of each type, since for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m, jn+1 is a dummy agent. However, we will only care about those with index lower than n + 1. This can be made without loss of generality and it is an assumption that Rochford (1983) also makes. 7 Let µ 1 = µ 2 be two optimal matchings. The non-trivial case occurs when agent j-i is matched in µ 1 and
Again, it is important to point out that b(x) does not depend on the specific optimal matching chosen. Indeed, it is not difficult to show that the set of all agents can be partitioned in two sets, both of them having the same number of agents of all types: those that belong to the same essential coalition in any optimal matching and those that do not. If agent j-i belongs to the first subset, we trivially have that b
ji (x) for any
On the other hand, threats of agents of the second set coincide with their payoff in x, which, after some calculations, implies that b µ ji (x) = t ji (x) for any agent j-i of the second set. In conclusion, b(x) does not depend on the specific optimal assignment chosen. Additionally observe that, given x ∈ C(ω A ), the vector of symmetrically bargained incomes b(x) pays to each agent j-i his threat plus a 'symmetric' part of the (negative or positive) difference between the worth of any essential coalition that contains her and belongs to some optimal matching µ and the threats of agent j-i herself and her partners in µ. In particular, given x ∈ C(ω A ) a new vector b(x) is obtained after a process of bargaining.
As usual, we focus our attention on those allocations that are invariant through the above bargaining procedure.
Definition 3 Given a balanced m-SAG (N, ω A ), the set of symmetrically multilateral-bargained (SMB) allocations is
Notice that SM B(ω A ) is only defined for balanced m-SAGs and is a subset (or a refinement) of the core. In the next section we will prove that SM B(ω A ) is always nonempty for balanced m-SAGs (see Theorem 7) and that, unlike the two-sided case, it does not coincide with the kernel (see Example 8) . Furthermore, we will prove that, for more than two sides, the kernel can be slightly modified so that a characterization of SM B(ω A ) in terms of this new kernelbased set is still possible (see Theorem 6), hence extending Rochford's (1983) result and proving that her intuition about the non-appropriateness of the kernel in m-SAGs, in which the 'essential' coalitions consist on more than two agents, was right.
In addition to all the above, recall that an allocation belongs to the kernel of a m-sided assignment, K(ω A ), if any pair of agents in the market, namely j-i and k-l, are in equilibrium through a bilateral bargaining, that is s j-i,k-l (x) = s k-l,j-i (x). However, as we have already said, in a m-SAG, it is m agents (one of each side) that are needed to make a deal. Hence, it seems natural to look for multilateral equilibria instead of bilateral equilibria. To do so we extend the surplus functions given in (3) to include surpluses of any agent either against essential coalitions containing her or singletons. Formally, given (N, ω A ) an arbitrary m-SAG, we introduce the following set, that is defined for any agent j-i and any B being either an essential coalition containing j-i or a singleton,
Observe that, when B is an essential coalition, let us say
is precisely the set introduced in (4). On the other hand, when B is a singleton, the set defined in (5) is exactly the set defined in (2). For any x ∈ I(ω A ), the surplus of agent j-i against B at x is
where, again, B is either an essential coalition containing j-i or a singleton. Notice that, for m = 2, (6) coincides with (3). This having been defined, we introduce a kernel-based set that requires that, after a bargaining process among all agents, none of them should be 'discriminated' against agents of her same type (P1) whereas agents of any possible essential coalition should make a 'fair' deal among them (P2).
Definition 4 Given an arbitrary m-SAG (N, ω A ), the multi-sided kernel (in short, m-Kernel)
is the set
Notice that, in the above definition, we do not require (N, ω A ) to be balanced. Moreover, in the next section we will prove that K m (ω A ) is always nonempty, regardless (N, ω A ) is balanced or not (see Theorem 5) . Lastly, the reader can check that, given a balanced m-SAG (N, ω A ), if x ∈ C(ω A ) then s j-i,k-l (x) = 0 for any agents j-i and k-l that are not assigned together under some optimal matching. This implies the following remark. 
Remark 1 Given a balanced m-SAG
(N, ω A ) and x ∈ C(ω A ), then x ∈ K m (ω A ) if
Main results
This section is primarily devoted to prove that, for any balanced m-SAG (N, ω A ), the set SM B(ω A ) is nonempty and can be characterized by the multi-sided kernel. First we show that the kernel is always included in the multi-sided kernel.
Theorem 5 For any arbitrary m-SAG
Proof. Take x ∈ K(ω A ) and assume, without loss of generality, that E = (1, ..., 1) and
On one hand, suppose that there is S * ∈ Γ 1-1.E such that m-1 ∈ S * and s 1-1,E (x) = e(S * , x). By definition of Γ 1-1.E , there is j, 2 ≤ j ≤ m − 1 such that
, which implies that all inequalities must be tight. On the other hand, suppose that, for all S ∈ Γ 1-1,E such that m-1 ∈ S, we have that s 1-1,E (x) > e(S, x). Then, s 1-1,m-1 (x) = s 1-1,E (x) and, since
Again, all inequalities must be tight. In conclusion, s 1-1,E (x) = ... = s m-1,E (x) and, since E = (1, ..., 1) was picked without loss of generality,
Example 8 at the end of the paper shows that the inclusion of
The main theorem of the paper is devoted to characterizing the set of symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations of a balanced multi-sided assignment game in terms of the core and the multi-sided kernel, hence generalizing Rochford's (1983) main result.
Theorem 6 Given a balanced m-SAG
Proof. Before proving the two inclusions we show that given µ ∈ M * A (N 1 , ..., N m ), E ∈ µ and j-i ∈ E then, for any x ∈ C(ω A ), we have that
Throughout the whole proof we will assume, without loss of generality, that µ = {(i, ..., i) :
1 ≤ i ≤ n} is an optimal matching of (N 1 , ..., N m ; A). In particular, given j-i an arbitrary agent, E = (i, ..., i) is the essential coalition of µ that contains j-i. By Definition 1 and (6),
we have that, for any agent j-i,
We will prove (7) by the counterreciprocal. Indeed, suppose that the above inequality is strict, i.e., that there is S ∈ Γ j-i,E such that . (9) e(S, x) > −x ji + t ji (x)
Since S ∈ Γ j-i,E and E = (i, ..., i), there must be k ∈ {1, ..., n} such that k-i / ∈ S. Let µ ∈ M * A (N 1 ∩ S, ..., N m ∩ S). We distinguish two cases.
• Case 1: S ∩ N j ≤ min k∈{1,..,j−1,j+1,...,m} S ∩ N k . 
where the first inequality holds since x ∈ C(ω A ) and the second inequality holds by Definition 1, since µ −1
• Case 2: S ∩ N j > min k∈{1,..,j−1,j+1,...,m} S ∩ N k .
If j-i is assigned under µ, it is left to reader to prove that an analogous argument as the above demonstrates that e (S, x) ≤ −x ji + t ji (x). Thus, suppose that j-i is not assigned under µ or that there is no such µ. In such case we have
where the first inequality holds again because x ∈ C(ω A ) and the last inequality holds since t ji (x) ≥ 0.
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In conclusion, we have proved that e(S, x) ≤ −x ji +t ji (x), which contradicts the assumption made in (9) . Hence, inequality in (8) must be tight, which implies that (7) must hold.
Having (7) been proved, we are in a position to prove the theorem. First we prove that
On one hand, since
On the other hand, since x ∈ K m (ω A ), we also have that s j-i,E (x) = s k-i,E (x) for all 1 ≤ k = j ≤ m, where E = (i, ..., i). Thus, applying (7) we obtain that (11)
Lastly, combining (10) and (11) we get
for 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, which is equivalent to
In conclusion, x ∈ SM B(ω A ).
Second, we prove that
is always included in C(ω A ), we only have to check that SM B(ω A ) ⊆ K m (ω A ). Indeed, let
x ∈ SM B(ω A ). Then, for all 1 ≤ j ≤ m and 1 ≤ i ≤ n, we have that
Applying (7) to s j-i,E (x), where E = (i, ..., i), and using the above equality we obtain
that does not depend on j. Hence, s 1-i,E (x) = ... = s m-i,E (x) for any 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Since we have chosen E = (i, ..., i) ∈ µ without loss of generality, we have proved that (P2) holds for any essential coalition belonging to some optimal matching. It remains to show that this implies that (P2) also holds for any coalition that does not belong to any optimal matching, in particular µ. Let E = (i 1 , ..., i m ) be one of such coalitions and take j ∈ {2, ..., m}. On one hand, if i j = i 1 , since x ∈ C(ω A ), by (3) we have that s 1-i 1 ,j-i 1 (x) ≤ 0. On the other hand, if i j = i 1 , we have that s 1-i 1 ,j-i j (x) = 0 because 1-i 1 and j-i j are not assigned together under µ. Hence, since E / ∈ µ implies that there is at least one j ∈ {2, ..., m} such that i j = i 1 , we obtain that
Lastly, since above we have chosen s 1-i 1 , E (x) without loss of generality, then Moreover, as a consequence of the above theorem we prove that the set of symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations is always non-emtpy for any balanced m-SAG. Proof. It holds directly from Theorem 5, Theorem 6 and the fact that C(ω A ) ∩ K(ω A ) is nonempty (Schmeidler, 1969 , proves it for arbitrary balanced games).
To illustrate the results contained in the paper, let us consider the following example. 
